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Fairness is one of the most important foundations of morality and may have played a key
role in the evolution of cooperation in humans beings. As an important type of fairness
concern, inequity aversion is the preference for fairness and the resistance to inequitable
outcomes. To examine the early development of fairness preference in young children,
sixty 2- and 3-year-old children were recruited to examine young children’s preferences
for fairness using a forced choice paradigm. We tested how toddlers acted when they
took charge of distributing resources (two candies) to themselves and others and when
they were the recipients of both other-advantageous distribution and self-advantageous
distribution. Different alternative options were paired with the same fair option in the
two conditions. In the other-advantageous condition, children had fewer resources in
the alternative options than others, whereas their resources in the alternative options
were greater than others’ in the self-advantageous condition. The results showed that
more children displayed fairness preferences when they distributed resources between
two friends than when they distributed resources between a friend and themselves. In
both scenarios, 3-year-old children were more likely to demonstrate fairness preference
than 2-year-old children. The findings suggest that inequity aversion develops in young
children and increases with age over the course of early childhood. When they were
recipients, there was a trend in young children’s preference for fairness in the other-
advantageous condition compared with the self-advantageous condition. This suggests
that children might tend to be more likely to display inequity aversion when they are in a
disadvantageous position.
Keywords: fairness, inequity aversion, young children, forced choice paradigm, distribution
INTRODUCTION
As the philosopher John Rawls noted, ‘the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness’
(Rawls, 1958). Fairness is one of the most important foundations of morality in both older
(Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1969) and newer (Haidt and Graham, 2007) theories of moral psychology.
Unsurprisingly, fairness concerns have received much attention in the areas of behavioral
economics (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), psychology (Declerck et al., 2009) and evolutionary biology
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Bräuer et al., 2006). Human beings have a substantial desire for
fairness and show strong aversions to inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Even third parties
who do not personally suffer from the inequity will punish others for unfair behavior to achieve
fairness (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008b). Inequity aversion
and the rejection of unfairness are considered essential for maintaining cooperation and reducing
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opportunities for free riders (Kogut, 2012) and thus may have
played a key role in the evolution of cooperation in humans (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
A wealth of empirical evidence gathered by experimental
economists and psychologists suggests that a high percentage of
people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and
that concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in
social interactions (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Theories such as
the dual concern model (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) and the social
utility model (Loewenstein et al., 1989) suggest that people prefer
to consider the other’s benefits in their distribution decisions in
addition to the wish to maximize one’s own utility. According
to the social utility model, people feel more comfortable and
experience greater satisfaction with the equal distribution of
resources than with inequitable allocations, even when those
inequities are self-advantageous (Loewenstein et al., 1989;
Kogut, 2012). In addition, the ERC (Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition) model, proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
highlights the concern for one’s relative position (competition) in
social interactions.
As an important type of fairness concern, inequity aversion
is one’s preferences against receiving either more or less than
someone else (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Although people are
especially motivated to achieve fairness when the inequity is to
one’s own disadvantage, there is some evidence showing that the
desire for fairness is strong even when the inequity is to one’s
advantage (Haynes and Gilovich, 2010). As proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), there are two kinds of inequity aversion
(IA): one is disadvantageous IA, in which another individual
receives more than oneself, and the other is advantageous IA,
in which one receives more than another individual (Hatfield
et al., 1978). It is argued that adults will sacrifice their own
benefits to eliminate inequalities they view as unfair by punishing
unequal outcomes, both when they are offered more resources
than a social partner (advantageous IA) and when they are
offered relatively fewer resources (disadvantageous IA) (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;
Dawes et al., 2007). Therefore, the sense of fairness has at least two
distinct components, including a desire to be fair and a desire to
signal to others that they are fair (Shaw et al., 2014).
The research on sharing behavior in adults suggests that
people tend to share their resources and feel better with an
equal distribution even when no strategic considerations exist
(Loewenstein et al., 1989). Adult preferences for equity using
strategic and economic games have been investigated in different
cultures (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005;
Camerer and Fehr, 2006), and substantial behavioral variability
across social groups was found; theories of both cultural
evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution are assumed to
explain the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals
and individual heterogeneity in altruism. However, less is known
about how the preference for fairness develops in childhood.
Some researchers have found that children begin to
understand fairness between the ages of 4 and 6 years old. Lane
and Coon (1972) found that 4-year-olds generally distributed
stickers selfishly to a fictitious partner, whereas most 5-year-olds
distributed stickers more equally to fictitious partner. Similarly,
Damon (1975) found that 4-year-old children often confused
fairness with their own desires in hypothetical dilemmas, while
5-year-olds began to focus on strict equality. Several studies
using behavioral economics methods (e.g., dictator game and
ultimatum game) (Gummerum et al., 2008) have found that 3-
to 4-year-old children would like to share some resources, but a
preference for equal distribution does not emerge until 7 years
of age or later (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Benenson et al., 2007).
Fehr et al. (2008a) found that most 3- to 4-year-old children
behaved selfishly, whereas most 7- to 8-year-olds preferred
equitable resource distribution, suggesting that children under
6 years old behaved primarily based on selfish desires than on
fairness concerns. Children’s preferences for equal distributions
increased with age (Benenson et al., 2007; Blake and Rand, 2010;
Gummerum et al., 2010). Children between 6 and 8 years old
begin to incur costs to avoid inequality such as discarding a
resource to avoid an unequal resource distribution (Blake and
McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw and Olson, 2012). Similarly, Hook and
Cook (1979) suggested that 8-year-old children are more willing
to bear costs to achieve fairness than 3-year-old children. In sum,
fairness preferences develop late in children, at the minimum, 6
or 7 years of age is when children distribute resources equally;
however, they develop an increasing preference for fairness
throughout the course of childhood (Fehr et al., 2008a; Shaw
et al., 2014).
On the other hand, recent research on infants and
preschoolers challenges this notion, showing that knowledge of
fairness and fair behavior emerges earlier than expected. Infants
who are 16 months old are able to pay attention to equality
in resource distribution by expecting resources to be allocated
equally among recipients using an index of looking time and
manual choices provided (Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and
Sommerville, 2011). Infants at 19 months of age looked longer
when one puppet received both items than when each puppet
received one item using a looking-time paradigm, suggesting that
19-month-old infants expected an equal allocation (Sloane et al.,
2012). Similar experiments have shown that even 15-month-olds
expect equal resource allocations (Sommerville et al., 2013). In
addition, a substantial amount of empirical evidence suggests that
3- to 4-year-old children already show a preference for fairness
in different contexts. Three-year-old children might notice and
be averse to disadvantageous inequality in distributions (Birch
and Billman, 1986). Children aged 3.5–4 years old show a strong
preference for giving one object equally to each doll (Olson and
Spelke, 2008). Children aged 4 years old favor equality over
giving others more resources and prefer fairness over generosity
in some circumstances (Kenward and Dahl, 2011). Around the
same age, they exhibit negative emotional reactions to unequal
distribution and are willing to incur costs to ensure that they do
not have less than others (LoBue et al., 2011). Phenomena on
inequity aversion in young children have been reported from the
developmental perspective, suggesting an early onset of inequity
aversion (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Paulus et al., 2013).
The existing empirical evidence on whether 3- to 4-year-old
and younger children prefer fairness (i.e., experience inequity
aversion) is not conclusive, indicating the need for more
studies on the ontogenetic origins of fairness. Specifically, older
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studies (e.g., Damon, 1975) suggested that children do not
develop fairness preferences until they are 5 years old or older,
whereas recent studies on infants and preschoolers showed that
a fairness preference emerges even in children younger than
2 years old. The discrepancy might be due to the differences in
both the paradigms and contexts. For example, infant studies
have adopted a preferential looking-time paradigm, which is
effective in gaining insight into the young mind by assessing
the characteristics of infants’ innate cognitive faculties (Cohen
and Cashon, 2003), whereas older studies (e.g., Lane and Coon,
1972 and Damon, 1975) used fictitious partners or hypothetical
dilemmas, which differ from real distribution contexts. In
addition, the inconsistent results on the preference for fairness
in young children might be due to the fact that some research
focused on the knowledge of fairness, whereas other research
focused on fair behavior. It is argued that having knowledge about
the principles of fairness does not guarantee that one will use
them when making decisions (Blake et al., 2014). For example,
when given a set of stickers, children between 3 and 8 years of
age recognize that sharing half of the stickers with an absent
child would be the right thing to do, but only 7- to 8-year-
old children actually distribute the stickers equally (Smith et al.,
2013). This gap between knowledge of fairness and fair behavior
might occur because younger children cannot inhibit their desires
for resources and thus fail to follow the fairness norms they
already know (Blake et al., 2014). The desire to maintain an
advantageous position compared with one’s peers is also adopted
to explain this gap (Blake et al., 2014).
It is argued that the development of children’s aversion
to disadvantageous and advantageous inequity is asymmetrical
(McAuliffe et al., 2013). Children as young as 3 years old
accept allocations that would place themselves in a relatively
advantageous position and reject those that would put them
at a relatively disadvantageous position (exhibiting aversion to
disadvantageous inequity) (Fehr et al., 2008a; Takagishi et al.,
2010; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; LoBue et al., 2011; Sheskin
et al., 2014). However, children do not develop an aversion to
advantageous inequity until 8 years old (Blake and McAuliffe,
2011; Shaw and Olson, 2012). In addition, experiments on non-
human animals have demonstrated that domestic dogs (Range
et al., 2009) and non-human primates (Jensen et al., 2006; Proctor
et al., 2013) are both sensitive to disadvantageous inequity, but no
evidence supports the notion that non-human animals perform
aversion to advantageous inequity. These findings from human
children and non-human animals might suggest that separate
developmental mechanisms underlie these two forms of inequity
aversion (McAuliffe et al., 2013).
Despite the demonstrated cross-cultural variability in young
children’s (Rao and Stewart, 1999; Rochat et al., 2009) and
adults’ (Henrich et al., 2005) resource distribution behaviors, a
potentially universal inclination for inequity aversion is worth
noting (Paulus, 2015). More fairness in distributive justice is
evident in 3- to 5-year-old children growing up in small-scale
urban and traditional societies that are thought to promote
more collective values (Rochat et al., 2009). Rao and Stewart
(1999) found that 4-year-old Chinese children showed more
spontaneous sharing than Indian children, while Indian children
performed substantially more passive sharing. Moreover, Zhu
et al. (2008) found that Chinese children and adolescents of
9, 12, and 14 years of age displayed a decreasing preference
for fairness with age in a dictator game as the proposer, while
many studies in Western cultures found an increasing tendency
in fairness preference with age (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Fehr
et al., 2008a; Shaw et al., 2014). Cultures that have a scarcity of
resources and a greater power distance (i.e., put less emphasis
on equality) and those that are less individualistic (i.e., put less
emphasis on the rights of individuals) (Hoftede et al., 2010)
constitute the cornerstone of human inequity aversion (Paulus,
2015). Traditional Chinese culture especially emphasizes equity,
for example, Confucius argued that “Do not worry about poverty,
but rather about the unequal distribution of wealth” (Confucius,
1980).
Previous fairness research has mostly relied on explicit
measures, such as interviews and questionnaires, to indicate
preference for fairness, which requires verbal responses
from children (Premack, 2007). However, verbal reports
may underestimate what children actually know, and thus
behavioral observations might be a more effective way to
examine fairness preferences in younger children (LoBue et al.,
2011). Economists have argued that two simple fairness-related
constructs, disadvantageous IA and advantageous IA, can be
measured without verbal reports (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). A forced choice paradigm is suitable for
children younger than 2 years old who have limited cognitive
and linguistic competence (Hamlin et al., 2007) and is usually
adopted to assess children’s responses to specific forms of
inequity (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011). Specifically, children must
choose between two options, for example, an advantageous
allocation (two candies for me and none for you) and an equal
allocation (e.g., one candy for me and one for you) that are
presented simultaneously.
In sum, a clear inconsistency in whether young children
display a fairness preference was found in previous studies,
and little research on young children’s preference for fairness
has been conducted in non-Western cultures. The goal of
this study was to examine young Chinese children’s fairness
preferences using an economic game paradigm. It is argued that
the knowledge-behavior gap might lead to inconsistent results
regarding when children are able to display a fairness preference,
and children younger than 3 years might have knowledge of
fairness but not display fair behavior. In the present study, we
mainly focused on young children’s actual fair behavior (as the
distributor). Scenarios about distributing resources as a third
party and distributing resources between the self and another
child were both included in our study. In addition to children’s
fair behavior when they are in power as the distributors, children’s
reactions when they are powerless recipients in dictator games
(Eckel and Grossman, 1996) may provide a complementary
picture of children’s preferences for fairness. A forced choice
paradigm, which is sensitive to young children, was adopted
in this study. In addition, cross-cultural variability in young
children’s preference for fairness has been shown in previous
studies. The preference for fairness in children 2–3 years of age in
Chinese culture, a typical Eastern culture that emphasizes power
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distances, interdependence and group harmony, was examined in
our study.
This study aimed to examine the development of fairness
preference in 2- and 3-year-old Chinese children when they
acted as distributors and as recipients. We hypothesized that
young children would allocate resources equally when they were
distributors, that the preference for fairness would increase with
age, and that when they were recipients, children as young
as 2 years old would prefer proposers who equally allocated
resources.
EXPERIMENT 1. CHILDREN’S FAIRNESS
PREFERENCE WHEN THEY WERE
DISTRIBUTORS
Method
Participants
Sixty 2- and 3-year-old children were recruited from two child
care centers in Baoding, Hebei province, China. One 2-year-
old child was excluded from the analysis because he did not
pay attention to the experimental procedures. The demographic
characteristics of the children included in the analysis are shown
in Table 1.
The ethics committee of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, approved our experiments. Informed
consent forms were obtained from all children’s parents.
Procedure
A 2 (age: 2-year-old and 3-year-old) ∗ 2 (distribution conditions:
distribute between self and friend and distribute between two
friends) design was adopted in this experiment.
The experiments were conducted in a quiet room at the child
care centers. In the warm-up phase, one human-like puppet and
two similar rabbit puppets were introduced to the children. In the
test phase, there were two conditions:
Condition 1: Distribute resources between self and friend.
Children were offered two candies and were asked whether/how
many they would like to give to another “friend,” which was a
human-like puppet. The instructions were as follows. “Now I am
giving you two candies. They are yours. Would you like to share
with Lele (the human-like puppet)?” If the answer was “yes,” then
the question “how many candies would you like to share with
Lele?” was asked.
Condition 2: Distribute resources between two friends.
Children were offered two candies and were asked to distribute
TABLE 1 | Age and gender distribution across conditions with children as
distributors.
Group Distribute between
self and friend
Distribute between
two friends
Months n (male) Months n (male)
2-year-old 28.1 ± 5.1 41 (23) 29.5 ± 4.5 26 (19)
3-year-old 40.5 ± 3.2 18 (10) 40.2 ± 4.0 11 (4)
both of these candies to two “friends,” which were two similar
rabbit puppets. The puppets were set on two sides of a table.
The distances between the two puppets and the children were the
same. The instructions were as follows. “Here I have two candies,
and they will be given to the two rabbits. I’d like to ask you to help
me distribute the two candies to the rabbits. How many candies
would you like to distribute to the rabbit on the left? How many
candies to the rabbit on the right? Please place the candy in front
of the rabbit.”
Children’s answers were coded as 0 (for an unfair distribution)
and 1 (for a fair distribution).
Results
Children’s choices were first compared with the level of chance
by binomial tests (see Figure 1). For 2-year-old children, their
preference for fairness did not differ from chance when they
distributed the resources between themselves and their friend
(54% of 2-year-old children preferred fairness, p > 0.05).
However, when they distributed the resources between two
friends, they significantly preferred fairness compared to the
level of chance (85% of 2-year-old children preferred fairness,
p < 0.001). For 3-year-old children, they were more likely
to prefer fairness above and beyond the level of chance both
when they distributed the resources between themselves and
their friend (89% of 3-year-old children preferred fairness,
p < 0.001) and when they distributed the resources between
two friends (100% of 3-year-old children preferred fairness).
This suggested that 3-year-old children significantly preferred
to distribute equally in both conditions, whereas 2-year-
old children performed randomly when distributing resources
between themselves and their friend but significantly preferred
to distribute equally when distributing resources between two
friends.
The binary logistic regression showed that more children
displayed a fairness preference when they distributed resources
between two friends than when they distributed resources
between themselves and their friend [χ2(1) = 6.17, β = −1.56,
p = 0.013]. Three-year-old children were more likely to prefer
fairness than 2-year-old children regardless of whether they
distributed resources between themselves and their friend or
between two friends [χ2(1) = 5.66, β = −1.93, p = 0.017].
FIGURE 1 | Children’s fairness preference when they were the
distributors.
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The interaction between distribution conditions and age was not
significant [χ2(1)= 2.56, p= 0.109].
Experiment 1 revealed young children’s fairness preferences
when they were the distributors. We were further interested in
understanding young children’s fairness preferences when they
were the recipients, which we examined in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2. CHILDREN’S FAIRNESS
PREFERENCE WHEN THEY WERE
RECIPIENTS
Method
Participants
The same 60 children participated in study 2 (completing four
tasks in total). The order of the four tasks was counterbalanced.
Three children were not included in the analysis because they
did not finish the study, and one child was not included in the
analysis because he did not pay attention to the procedures.
The demographic characteristics of the children included in the
analysis are shown in Table 2.
The ethics committee at the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, approved our experiments. Informed
consent forms from children’s parents were obtained for all
subjects.
Procedure
A 2 (age: 2-year-old and 3-year-old) ∗ 4 (distribution conditions:
(2,0)−(1,1), (1,0)−(1,1), (1,2)−(1,1), and (0,2)−(1,1)) design was
adopted in this experiment.
The experiments were also conducted in a quiet room at the
child care centers. The entire experiment was demonstrated as a
puppet show to attract the young children’s attention. A forced
choice paradigm was adopted to examine young children’s
preference for fairness. In the warm-up phase, one human-like
puppet was introduced to the children as their counterpart. The
participating child and the human-like puppet were both the
recipients. Four pairs of hand puppets were also prepared, and
each hand puppet pair was the same except for their colors.
The experimenter used two hand puppets: one that distributed
fairly between the child and the counterpart and another that
distributed unfairly. The two hand puppets were placed in front
of the child, and the distances between the child and these two
hand puppets were the same. A control question of “how many
gifts did the distributor give to you and your counterpart?” was
first asked. Only children who answered the control question
correctly moved into the test question phase; otherwise, the
experimenter played the puppet show again. In the test question
phase, the child was asked to choose which distributor he or she
liked. Children’s answers were coded “1” for choosing the fair
distributor and “0” for the unfair distributor.
There were four conditions that reflected different
combinations of the fair versus unfair distributions (Table 2).
In each condition, the fair puppet distributor gave both the
participant and his or her counterpart one gift; the unfair
puppet distributor gave the participant either more or less than
his or her play partner. In the (1, 1)−(2, 0) scenario, the fair
distributor allocated one gift to the subject and one gift to his
or her counterpart; the unfair distributor gave the subject two
gifts and nothing to the counterpart. The order of the equal and
unequal distributions in each condition, the position of the fair
distributor and the unfair distributor, and the sequence of the
four conditions were all counterbalanced.
Results
The children’s preferences for fairness are shown in Figure 2.
Children’s choices were compared to the level of chance
by binomial tests. For 2-year-old children, they significantly
preferred fairness in the (1,2)−(1,1) condition [70% of 2-
year-old children preferred fairness, p = 0.012] and the
(0,2)−(1,1) condition [88% of 2-year-old children preferred
fairness, p < 0.001], and their choices were similar to the
level of chance in the (2,0)−(1,1) [58% of 2-year-old children
FIGURE 2 | The percentage of children preferring to fairness when
others distributed resources for them and puppet.
TABLE 2 | Age and gender distribution across conditions with children as recipients.
Age group (1,1)−(2,0) (1,1)−(1,0) (1,1)−(1,2) (1,1)−(0,2)
Months n (male) Months n (male) Months n (male) Months n (male)
2-year-old 28.2 ± 5.3 38 (23) 28.1 ± 5.2 40 (24) 28.1 ± 5.2 37 (21) 29.0 ± 4.8 24 (13)
3-year-old 40.7 ± 3.3 17 (9) 40.7 ± 3.4 16 (9) 40.7 ± 3.4 16 (9) 40.3 ± 3.5 14 (6)
Four alternative options were paired with fair option (1,1) in these four conditions. For example, in the (1,1)−(2,0) scenario, the fair distributor allocated one gift to the
subject, and one gift to his or her counterpart, whereas the unfair distributor gave the subject two gifts and nothing to the counterpart. Children were asked which
distributor they preferred.
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preferred fairness, p > 0.05] and (1,0)−(1,1) [50% of 2-year-old
children preferred fairness, p > 0.05] conditions. For 3-year-
old children, they significantly displayed a fairness preference
in the conditions of (1,0)−(1,1) [75% of 3-year-old children
preferred fairness, p = 0.041] and of (0,2)−(1,1) [79% of 3-year-
old children preferred fairness, p = 0.026], and their preference
choices were similar to chance in the (2,0)−(1,1) [47% of 3-year-
old children preferred fairness, p > 0.05] and (1,2)−(1,1) [69%
of 3-year-old children preferred fairness, p > 0.05] conditions.
This suggested that 2-year-old children significantly preferred
fair choices when they were in the disadvantaged position in the
alternative options but selected randomly when they were in the
advantageous position in the alternative option. Three-year-old
children significantly preferred fair choices when they were in
the clearly disadvantaged position in the alternative option [(0,2)]
and also preferred fairness when their own benefit in the fair
option did not decrease compared with the alternative option
[(1,0)−(1,1)], whereas they selected randomly when their own
payoff in the fair option decreased compared with the alternative
option [(2,0)−(1,1)].
Binary logistic regression showed that children’s preferences
for fairness significantly differed across the distribution scenarios
when they distributed sources with their friend [χ2(3) = 10.03,
p = 0.018]. Preferences for fairness were comparable in the
2- and 3-year-olds when they distributed resources with their
friend [χ2(1) = 0.04, β = −0.07, p = 0.837]. The interaction
between the alternative options and age was not significant
[χ2(3) = 3.86, p = 0.277]. The two age groups were then
combined to further analyze the effect of the alternative options.
Compared with the other three alternatives, the (0,2) option
was more likely to motivate children to select a fair choice
[(0,2) versus (2,0): χ2(1) = 8.15, β = −1.49, p = 0.004; (0,
2) versus (1,0): χ2(1) = 7.03, β = −1.38, p = 0.008; and
(0,2) versus (1,2): χ2(1) = 2.40, β = −0.83, p = 0.121].
Young children showed similar fairness preferences between the
conditions of (2, 0)−(1, 1) and (1, 0)−(1, 1) [χ2(1) = 0.08,
β = 0.11, p = 0.780], as well as between the conditions of
(2, 0)−(1, 1) and (1, 2)−(1, 1) [χ2(1) = 2.65, β = 0.66,
p = 0.104]. This result demonstrated that the children were
more likely to display a fairness preference when they were
in a disadvantageous position, but not when they were in an
advantageous position.
We combined the (2,0) and (1,0) conditions as
self-advantageous conditions and (1,2) and (0,2) as other-
advantageous conditions (showed in Figure 3). There was a
trend in young children’s preference for fairness in the other-
advantageous condition more so than in the self-advantageous
condition [F(1,33) = 3.97, p = 0.055, η2p = 0.11]. Moreover,
in the self-advantageous condition, the interaction between
the alternative options and age was significant [F(1,53) = 3.98,
p = 0.05, η2p = 0.07]. For 2-year-old children, their preferences
for fairness were similar when the alternative options [(2, 0) and
(1, 0)] were different. However, there was a trend in 3-year-old
children to be more likely to consider the other’s benefit when
their own payoff was the same [t(15) = −1.732, p = 0.10,
d= 1.1]. The small sample might have contributed to the absence
of significance in 3-year-old children in terms of the value of
index d. In the other-advantageous conditions, children always
preferred fairness [F(1,34)= 3.62, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.10].
Discussion
This study aimed to examine the development of fairness
preferences in 2- and 3-year-old Chinese children as distributors
and recipients. We hypothesized that young children would
allocate resources equally when they were distributors, that the
preference for fairness would increase with age, and that children
as young as 2 years old would prefer proposers who equally
allocated resources when they were the recipient. It was found
that children displayed fairness preferences early, as young as
2 years old. Young children’s fairness preferences increased with
age and were influenced by distribution contexts.
Fairness Preference When Children Were the
Distributors
Young children’s preference for fairness increased with age
both when distributing resources between self and friend
and distributing between two friends. Moreover, 3-year-old
children displayed higher levels of fair behavior than the level
of chance in both conditions, whereas 2-year-old children
performed randomly in conditions of distributing resources
between themselves and their friend but significantly preferred
to distribute equally in conditions of distributing resources
between two friends. The results suggested an early onset of
inequity aversion (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Paulus et al., 2013)
FIGURE 3 | Children’s fairness preference in conditions of self-advantageous and other-advantageous when they were the recipients.
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and provided evidence of inequity aversion based on young
children’s actual fair behavior, not only on fair knowledge (Sloane
et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2013). Moreover, an increasing
preference for fairness over the course of early childhood was also
evident, similar to the findings in Western cultures (Eisenberg
et al., 1998; Fehr et al., 2008a; Shaw et al., 2014). These findings
suggest that there is cross-cultural consistency in the early onset
of inequity aversion and increasing fairness preference in young
children.
In addition, young children were more likely to prefer fairness
when they distributed resources between two friends than when
they distributed resources between themselves and their friend.
This might be due to the fact that self-interest served as an
important motivating factor when they distributed resources
between themselves and a friend. The difficulties in inhibiting
their strong desire for candies might have led them to show a
lower level of fairness preference (Blake et al., 2014). On the
other hand, preference for fairness has typically been measured
by children’s judgments regarding how to allocate resources
between third parties (Damon, 1979), and thus the self-interest
motive is excluded by this method. Our study examined young
children’s preference for fairness as a third party as well, and
we found that young children displayed a high level of fairness
preference when they distributed resources between two friends,
especially in 3-year-old children. The attempts of young children
to achieve equal distributions when they were third parties
provided evidence for a strong inequity aversion (Paulus, 2015).
Fairness Preference When Children Were the
Recipients
We found that young children’s preferences for fairness differed
in the four distribution scenarios when they were the recipient;
specifically, (0,2) as the alternative option was more likely to
motivate young children to select a fair choice. Moreover, there
was a trend toward young children’s preference for fairness in
the other-advantageous condition than in the self-advantageous
condition. Children were also more likely to prefer fairness
with fewer payoffs in the other-advantageous condition. In other
words, children tended to be more likely to show inequity
aversion when they were in a disadvantageous position than
when they were in an advantageous position. This result is
similar to the findings of previous studies. For example, Birch
and Billman (1986) found that 3-year-old children might notice
and be averse to disadvantageous inequality in distributions. In
addition, children 4–7 years old accepted allocations that put
themselves at a relatively advantageous position and rejected
those that put themselves at a relatively disadvantageous position
(Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Sheskin et al., 2014).
Although no significant differences in the preference for
fairness were found between 2- and 3-year-old children when
they were the recipients, further analysis showed that 3-year-old
children were more likely to consider others’ benefit when their
own payoff was the same in the self-advantageous condition. In
the condition (1,1)−(1,0), called the “prosocial game” in Fehr
et al.’s (2008a) study, children’s payoff was the same, while others’
payoff was different. Three-year-old children were more likely to
consider others’ interest and show other-regarding preferences
than 2-year-old children. Children were at an advantageous
position in the (1,1)−(2,0) conditions, and they had to inhibit
their own strong desire for candy and thus incur costs to
behave fairly. In total, 58% of the 2-year-olds and 47% of the
3-year-old children preferred fairness in this condition, which
both did not differ from chance (50%). Thus, we argued that
children as young as 2 years old might already have developed
a fairness preference and not be completely self-interested. In
the meantime, this conclusion should be considered cautiously,
and additional research should be conducted to further test the
robustness of the finding.
For 2-year-old children, they were more likely to prefer
fairness in the (1,1)−(1,2) condition, called the “envy game” in
Fehr et al.’s (2008a) study, than in the (1,1)−(1,0) condition.
Children’s payoffs remained the same, but the other’s payoffs
were greater than their own in the (1,1)−(1,2) condition and
less than their own in the (1,1)−(1,0) condition. Two-year-
old children may already know how to avoid disadvantages
in fairness by comparing their own payoff to others’ and may
make decisions based on their relative advantage rather than
focusing solely on their own gains (Blake et al., 2014). The
concern for a relative advantage may prevent children from
acting on their fairness knowledge when they actually allocate
resources, especially in younger children. As the ERC (Equity,
Reciprocity, and Competition) model states, competition in
social interactions is highly considered by individuals (Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000). It is argued that competition may
render fairness considerations irrelevant when there is no
opportunity to punish the monopolist (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).
Children younger than 2 years old already display a fairness
preference (Sloane et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2013).
In the present study, although 2-year-old children began to
prefer fairness in some conditions, their performance in some
conditions, such as distributing resources between self and friend
as a distributor and distributing resources in self-advantageous
conditions as recipients, was similar to that of the random
level. The difference might be due to the fact that knowledge of
fairness was examined in Sloane et al.’s (2012) and Sommerville
et al.’s (2013) study, whereas fair behavior through participant
involvement was examined in our study. This gap between
fairness knowledge and fair behavior might be due to children’s
desire to maintain an advantageous position compared to their
peers (Blake et al., 2014). Moreover, this gap is argued to be
motivated in children by a context of windfall gains, in which
strategic concerns with maintaining an advantageous position
relative to their peers appear to prevent children from following
fairness norms (Blake et al., 2014). As in our study, the resources
were given by the experimenter and were not earned by the
participants. It is predicted that children younger than 2 years old
might be able to apply fairness norms in the context of gaining
resources through collaborative efforts. In addition, a weak
executive function may prevent young children from inhibiting
their desires for the resources (i.e., candy) when they are in
charge of the distribution, and they are accordingly unable to
follow the fairness norms that they already know (Blake et al.,
2014).
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Limitations and Implications
Fewer 3-year-olds than 2-year-olds participated in this study.
A larger sample size of participants should be recruited, time and
resources permitting, to increase the statistical power of testing
the developmental differences in fairness preferences of 2- and
3-year-old children.
We would have found it interesting to examine the
development of fairness preferences in children. However, only
cross-sectional data were collected in this study. Longitudinal
designs and analysis will be a future direction of this research.
Young Chinese children’s fairness preferences were examined
in the study. This is one of the few studies conducted in a non-
Western sample. Future studies should increase the scientific
knowledge regarding child development in different cultural
contexts.
Children as young as 2 years old already displayed fairness
preferences in our study. To provide evidence for the ontogenetic
origins of fairness, future research can examine whether the
preference for fairness emerges in even younger children.
Eye tracking technology is an effective way to investigate
psychological mechanisms in young children, even in non-verbal
infants. Future studies should adopt eye tracking technology to
investigate the evolutionary origins of fairness preferences in
younger children.
CONCLUSION
When young children allocated resources as the distributor,
their preference for fairness increased with age, and they were
more likely to prefer fairness when they distributed resources
between two friends than when they distributed resources
between themselves and a friend. Our results suggest that
even young children (2-year-olds) display inequity aversion and
this preference for fairness increases over the course of early
childhood.
When young children were distributed resources as
the recipients, their preference for fairness differed in the
four distribution scenarios. There was a trend in young
children’s preferences for fairness in the other-advantageous
condition in comparison with the self-advantageous condition.
That is, children may tend to be more likely to display
inequity aversion when they are in a disadvantageous
position.
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